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or decades Congress has been
cutting into the old cbmmon law
"American Rule" that says parties to
litigation must pay their own way
through the legal system whether they
win or lose. From the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 to the Equal Access to Justice
Act of 1980, Congress has passed some
forty statutes under which prevailing
plaintiffs in a variety of civil actions can
*Susan Bennett is a clinical instructor and
Director of the Public Interest Clinic, Washington College of Law, American University.
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petition the court to require their unsuccessful opponents to pay their fees and
court costs. Losing parties who can now
be forced to shoulder their opponents'
litigation costs range from private
landlords under the Fair Housing Act, to
the federal government itself.
The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act
of 1976, at 42 U.S.C. §1988, gave courts
discretion, "...(to) allow a prevailing
party, other than the United States, a
reasonable attorney's fee as part of the
costs." The legislative history of this law
shows that the goal of civil attorney's fees

legislation is to encourage litigants who
might not otherwise be able to afford
counsel to assert certain meritorious
claims in court, and in so doing to function as private attorneys general for the
enforcement of these laws. Put another
way, the message projected by these feeshifting statutes is simple: it is possible to
litigate "poor people's issues"-consumer
protection, welfare rights-without being
a "poor people's lawyer".
Practitioners should note that these opportunities for litigation and compensation are not limited to the federal court
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system. Since state courts can adjudicate
federal causes of action, they can also
award federal statutory attorney's fees.
County Executive of Prince George's County
v. Doe, 300 Md. 445, 452, 479 A.2d
352, 356 (Md. 1984).
Common to all litigation, whether in
state or federal court, concerning civil attorneys' fees statutes are two recurring
issues: first, how much success, and on
what issues, must a "prevailing party"
win in order to earn an award of fees, and
second, what must a court consider in its
calculation of the "reasonable fee"? The

goal of this article is to provide encouragement, and some caveats, to attorneys in search of a practice that will
both reward the conscience and pay the
bills.
How does one "prevail"?
In Hensley v. Eckerhart, the Supreme
Court's first attempt to set standard
criteria for calculation of statutory attorney's fees, the Court advanced a basic
formula for compensation: "the number
of hours reasonably expended on the
litigation multiplied by a reasonable

.
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hourly rate." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461
U.S. 424 (1983). The Court said it
wanted to make this formula and all
other standards enunciated in the opinion to be applicable to all cases invoking federal statutes that allow fee awards
to "prevailing parties." The threshold
issue, one with a history which long
precedes Hensley, is how a court should
decide whether a plaintiff has sufficiently "prevailed" to be entitled to attorney's fees. The question has evolved:
for which specific hours may a prevailing
plaintiff claim compensation?
Maryland Bar Journal/September 1985/17

Some consensus has emerged concerning some aspects of the definition of
"prevailing party." It is clear that a party can receive a fee award for having won
a preliminary injunction, or for a successful settlement. The Fourth Circuit
has approved fees awarded pursuant to
29 U.S.C. §794(b), the Rehabilitation
Act, on a "catalyst" theory: that plaintiff's filing of the civil action prompted
defendants to act to plaintiff's significant
benefit. Disabled in Action v. Mayor and
City Council of Baltimore, 685 F.2d 881,
885 (4th Cir. 1982). This Circuit and the
District Court of Maryland have also consistently awarded fees regardless of the
amount of money damages, particularly
when the plaintiff has succeeded in securing rights of intangible monetary worth.
Burtv. Abel, 585 F.2d 613, 617 (4th Cir.
1978); Coles v. Levin, 561 F. Supp. 146
(D. Md. 1983).

Generally, the Fourth Circuit has
defined "prevailing" as the achievement
of some vindication through litigation,
an "establishment of a right or proscription of a wrong," Smith v. University of
North Carolina,632 F.2d 316, (4th Cir.
1980), and has allowed full compensation even in the absence of success on
every issue, Disabled in Action v. Mayor
and City ofBaltimore, 685 F.2d 881, 886
(4th Cir. 1982). But see Coles v. Levine,
561 F. Supp. 146, 156 (D. Md. 1983);
Storch v. Payne, 579 F. Supp. 1074, 1080
(D. Md. 1983), (fees reduced or denied
because of lack of success, or because
favorable settlement established no
significant rights).
18/Maryland Bar Journal/September 1985

In Hensley the Supreme Court sought
to clarify how a court should determine
fees when a plaintiff had achieved only
partial success. The Court stressed the
importance of avoiding a mechanical
award of fees apportioned according to
success or failure. However, it also emphasized that courts should require plaintiff to keep records in sufficient detail to
enable the judge to distinguish between
hours spent on successful issues, and
hours spent on failing issues, so that the
judge could award compensation for the
former. Thus, the message is mixed. A
district court now has, in general, the
discretion to recognize the significance of
a plaintiff's achievement and to award
fees without quibbling over whether
every hour billed contributed to an identifiable successful result. Yet it also has the
obligation to deny compensation for
hours spent on matters unrelated to the
winning issues. In its desire to give
substance to the nebulous concept of the
"prevailing party," the Court has in fact
produced a new unit of measure: the
prevailing hour.
The most exhaustive application of the
"prevailing hours" doctrine to date in
this jurisdiction has been presented in
Vaughns, et al. v. Board of Education of
Prince George's County, et al., 598 F. Supp.
1262 (D. Md. 1984). A decision arising
from the re-opening in 1981 of a school
desegregation case filed in 1972, Vaughns
was devoted wholly to consideration of
how to calculate plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees. Involved were some two
years of discovery and motions practice,
plus twenty-five days of trial, out of
which plaintiffs ultimately prevailed on
one out of seven factual issues. Despite
the disparity between the number of
issues won and lost, the court never
disputed plaintiffs' claim to being the
prevailing party. Instead, in the spirit of
Hensley, the court concentrated on
eliminating from its calculations those
hours spent on unsuccessful claims.
After perusing the record and the fee
petitions, the court excised more than a
third of the 6055 hours for which plaintiffs' attorneys had sought compensation.
The reduction took account of imprecise
time records, and hours spent at trial in
support of unsuccessful claims.
Vaughns suggests at least three concerns
for the Maryland attorney seeking to
compensate his or her time via a "prevailing party" fee-shifting statute. First, in
deciding the number of hours for which
an attorney may request compensation,
the court will refuse to consider hours
spent ultimately in futility. Second, the
court will, in the process, scrutinize

closely the record and the affidavits submitted in support of the attorney's fee
petition. Third, the court will not
hesitate either to make reductions beyond
those that the attorney may already have
conceded, or to penalize attorneys who
keep ambiguous records.
Hensley's major point-that courts
should categorize issues as successful or
related to successful, or as unsuccessfulis closely associated with a problem which
often arises in litigation over fees in civil
rights cases: should a plaintiff who has
gained substantial relief collect fees, even
if the court grants relief under a statute
that does not authorize a fee award? The
major problem occurs usually when a
plaintiff alleges both a major deprivation
of a constitutional right and thus a cause
of action under 42 U.S.C. §1983, for
which 42 U.S.C. §1988 allows fees, and
a related statutory claim for which no
comparable attorney's fee statute exists.
In Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 104, S
Ct. 3457 (1984), the plaintiff pleaded both the Education of the Handicapped Act ("EHA"), which contains
no fee provision, and a Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. After prevailing on the EHA claim, the plaintiff
received fees under §1983, even though
the Court did not rule on the equal protection claim. The trial court's rationale
was that, under Maher v. Gagne, 448
U.S. 122 (1980), prevailing plaintiffs
should not be prejudiced in their fee requests by the traditional avoidance of
constitutional claims, and should receive
fees under §1988, if the unaddressed constitutional claim was substantial, and
related to the winning statutory claim.
Relying on Hensley, the Court reversed
the award.
Key to the reversal was this issue of
"relatedness." Since the Court interpreted the EHA as completely controlling the remedies available to the
plaintiff, and precluding any resort to any
constitutional claim, it found the equal
protection claim to be unrelated to the
winning EHA issue, and thus uncompensatable. By implication, if the
district court had actually reviewed the
plaintiff's equal protection claim, the
court would have rejected it as preempted by the EHA, and thus the claim
could not be classified as "substantial."
The Supreme Court's ruling in Smith
v. Robinson does not overrule the holding
in Maher v. Gagne, and should not
deter the practitioner who wishes
simultaneously to allege constitutional
and statutory claims for relief. But caution is advisable, both in the state and in
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the federal arenas. Even before Hensley
and Smith, the Court of Special Appeals
denied a §1988 claim because plaintiffs
had pleaded a constitutional, not a §1983
claim, and the court did not find these
to be synonymous, Brown v. Hornbeck, 54
Md. App. 404, 458 A.2d 900 (1983),
and because plaintiffs had prevailed
solely on the state law ground, with the
unaddressed equal protection claim
evaluated as totally unsubstantial. In
County Executive of PrinceGeorge's County
v. Doe, 300 Md. 445, 479 A.2d 352
(1984), the Court of Appeals, also confronting a prevailing statutory claim, an
unaddressed §1983 claim, and a §1988
request for fees, found the §1983 claim
to lack substance and denied the fees. Doe
at 465, 363. What seems clear is that attorneys who attempt to collect fees for
prevailing issues on the basis of unaddressed §1983 claims can expect to endure a second review on the merits, both
in state and federal court.
Practitioners should also take note of
the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Marek v. Chesny, 53 U.S.L.W. 4903
(6/25/85), in which the court ruled that
plaintiffs who win less in damages at trial
than they were offered in pre-trial settlement may not receive attorney's fees for
any of their post-settlement efforts. The
court held that Fed. R. Cir. P. 68, which
bars recovery of "costs" incurred in such
a situation, extends to attorney's fees
sought, in this case, under §1988.
What is the "reasonable fee"?
The metaphysical struggles of the courts
in selecting countable hours serves only
as a prelude to the more technical, but
conceptually less exhausting inquiry of
how to determine the reasonable fee. The
factors to be considered, first enumerated
by the Fifth Circuit in Johnson v. Georgia
Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714,
717-719 (1974), a Title VII case, were
adopted by the Fourth Circuit in Barber
v. Kimbrell's, Inc., 577 F.2d 216, 226
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(1978), a Truth in Lending case. As further refined by Anderson v. Morris, 658
F. 2d 246 (4th Cir. 1981) these factors
are still considered basic to calculations
of attorney's fees in this circuit, and are
in similar forms acknowledged in all circuits and by the Supreme Court to this
day. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 104
S.Ct. 154 (1984); Burnley v. Short, 730
F.2d 136, 141 (4th Cir. 1984)
(Barber/Johnsonstandard applied in a Fair
Labor Standards Act mandatory fees
award).

The twelve Barber/Johnson factors include the customary fee for the type of
work, the experience of the attorney and
the skill required by the task, the
novelty of the issues, and the attorney's
''opportunity costs." Using the formula
eventually adopted in Hensley, the Fourth
Circuit in Anderson v. Morrisproposed a
method of applying the twelve factors:
number of hours "reasonably expended"
multiplied by the customary rate (factors
one and five), with a subsequent adjustment of the result in light of the remaining factors. Vaughns, et al. v. Board of
Education of Prince George's County, supra,
illustrates in detail how a court may go
about determining market rate, reaching
a base fee, and then evaluating it for upward or downward adjustment in light
of the Barber/Johnsonfactors.
State Attorney's Fees Statutes
As is true in the federal system under the
American Rule, Maryland state courts
can only require an opposing party to pay
fees pursuant to specific statutory

authorization. Some Maryland statutes
do provide for awards to prevailing parties under limited circumstances.
However, the conduct of the losing
party rather than the success of the winner seems to be the triggering factor. Recent litigation under Maryland Rule
1-341, which allows a court to compel
payment by one party-or his culpable
attorney-of the opposing party's fees, if
the party is responsible for maintaining
his position in bad faith, or without
substantial justification, has raised the
issue of how to evaluate either standard.
In Blanton v. Equitable Bank, N.A., 61
Md. App. 158, 485 A.2d 694 (1985),
the Court of Special Appeals found that
defendant's attempt to appeal an unappealable collateral order lacked substantial justification, thereby allowing the
court to award fees under Maryland Rule
1-341. It is instructive to contrast the
Court of Special Appeals' calculation of
fees with the process labored over by the
federal courts. The Court found the
plaintiff's fee request to contain no
specific documentation of what personnel worked on the claim. The Court also
considered the nature of the work to be
fairly routine. Combining these factors,
the Court reduced the request for
$902.80 to $500, the primary rationale
for the reduction being that it was
"reasonable."
Cotlusion
The practice of public interest law, and
putting bread on the table, may well be
compatible; the message to be carried
away from the growing library of court
opinions is that, in filing a petition for
attorneys' fees, one may labor as
mightily for the bread as for the public
interest. While emphasizing the value of
compensating civil rights attorneys, the
Supreme Court has in some ways made
it more onerous for the trial court to do
so. The trial court must act more as an
auditor than an arbitrator; in some instances, the court must conduct virtually anew a review of issues which it
may previously have avoided on the
merits. The higher expectations for
documentation of course impose greater
burdens on the attorney. It is to be
hoped that the prospective public interest
attorney will regard these observations as
warnings, rather than as efforts to
discourage. Despite the possible difficulties, the inducements for this type of
representation still exist-the rewards inherent in the preservation of important
rights and, yes, the likelihood of
compensation-and the work remains to
be done.

